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populated neighborhoods amongst innocent people. The enemy is using insurgency and hybrid warfare to make it more difficult for the United States and coalition forces to employ kinetic weapon systems and technology. This paper argues that the use of cyberspace by insurgents is more prominent, lethal, and difficult to defeat. The paper will use operations in Afghanistan as a case study.
First, this paper will provide background of how forces predominantly fought in the past and employed conventional weapons in Counterinsurgency operations. Second, the author will clearly define cyberspace and present an in-depth discussion into the employment techniques, challenges and advantages of this readily available technology. Next, the paper will discuss Computer Network Attack (CNA), Computer Network Defense (CND), agencies and in theater policies at the strategic level. Lastly, the paper will close with a few recommendations that provide techniques to safeguard theater networks, resources and means to limit the numerous cyber challenges.
LEVERAGING CYBERSPACE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
Insurgents in Afghanistan interpret and use cyber-generated information and actions differently than U.S. operators. This is because the insurgents' context for decision making (no need to adhere to any law other than their own interpretation of the Koran), jihadist prism for viewing the environment, and indifference to killing innocent people allows them to intimidate, influence and mobilize their believers in ways unacceptable to civilized commanders. 1 First, this paper will provide background of how forces predominantly fought in the past and employed conventional weapons in Counterinsurgency operations. Second, the author will clearly define cyberspace and present an in-depth discussion into the employment techniques, challenges and advantages of this readily available technology. Next, the paper will discuss Computer Network Attack (CNA), Computer Network Defense (CND), agencies and in theater policies at the strategic level. Lastly, the paper will close with a few recommendations that provide techniques to safeguard theater networks, resources and means to limit the numerous cyber challenges.
The enemy is using insurgency and hybrid warfare to make it more difficult for the United States and Allied forces to employ kinetic weapon systems and technology. This paper argues that the use of cyberspace by insurgents is more prominent, lethal, and difficult to defeat in coalition operations in The Department of Defense (DoD) acknowledges that cyber/information warfare through media and other technology is the key to winning on the battlefield. Dating back to Sun Tzu's teachings, information warfare is the offensive and defensive use of information and information systems to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy an adversary's knowledge, communications, and perceptive access and processes.
Because cyberspace is critical to the enemy's success, coalition forces must be aware of the tactics and methods and creatively implement effective cyber counter techniques in the counterinsurgency operations plans. Common cyberspace stealth methods used by insurgents include encryption, domain name changing, fuse of proxy servers to obscure locations, and "dead dropping," where information remains as draft messages in fake email accounts.
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These email accounts are accessible to anyone with a password, thereby avoiding transmission and detection. 20 Considering the hundreds of thousands of servers and
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) worldwide, plus the billions of bytes passing over the network every second, the insurgent has a large playing field to roam.
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In Afghanistan, the Taliban banned television and even toothbrushes as forbidden modern innovations. Yet al Qaeda, led by educated and privileged gadget hounds, adapted early and enthusiastically to the technologies of globalization, and its
Arab volunteers managed to evade the Taliban's screen-smashing technology police.
[...] bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, have fallen well behind their younger followers worldwide. The two still make speeches in a makeshift studio and courier their message at considerable risk to Al-Jazeera or other satellite stations, as with Zawahiri's messages. Their younger adherents have moved on to Web sites and the production of short videos with shock appeal that is broadcast to millions instantly via the Internet. 22 Insurgents throughout Afghanistan are creative and use deceptive techniques such as "hide in plain site". This technique involves, what appears to be, a standard website of everyday advertisement such as Arab entertainment. To the common internet surfer this means nothing but to the trained eye or potential insurgent the site posses a trigger link, only visible for a short time, which will take the surfer to an extremist insurgent website. This is cyber deception whereas the access point cybervanishes in a short period of time. Techniques such as "hide in plain site" and cyber deception are not easily found nor is the site traceable to a single location, computer, or individual before the insurgent realizes the compromise and makes a change. 23 In some cases insurgents use IEDs to distract, disrupt, or delay opposing forces facilitating another attack. Insurgents do not detonate these destructive devices manually but through the use of cell phones; another cyber tool. A radio-controlled IED incorporates a modified cell phone with an electrical firing circuit. Cell phones operate in the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) band in line of sight with base transceiver station (BTS) antennae sites. Commonly, receipt of a paging signal by phone is sufficient to initiate the IED firing circuit. 24 All of the tools and resources used to design, build and detonate these destructive devices are easily accessible and clearly an indicator that insurgents are becoming more and more cyber savvy.
Acquisition of Cyber Resources
Coalition forces in Afghanistan periodically find cyber tools used by insurgents.
Intelligence confirms that the cyber tools are for communicating with other insurgents for potential IED emplacement locations. This is clearly evidence that insurgents have the means to fund and acquire cyber resources at will. Through the availability of the Internet, insurgents no longer have to travel throughout the country or even to a local medium to purchase their equipment. Sites such as Ebay, Amazon, and countless U.S.
retailers will unknowingly or knowingly ship cyber resources to insurgents once they pay for the items. Insurgents are constantly moving from place to place, between
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and are difficult to trace. Today, cyber tools sold around the world continue to be a click away for insurgents to purchase. Insurgents in Afghanistan attempt to broadcast their message for attacks and bombings to other cells so that they can destroy or kill as many innocent people as possible.
Methods to Coordinate and Advertise Insurgent Propaganda
The Nonetheless, it is the Coalition who finds itself in a defensive stance, not only to counter the Taliban propaganda but to gain legitimacy from a populace that is losing confidence in its efforts. 31 In the end, it is the Afghan people who will determine victory or defeat; Taliban seem to know this fact while the "liberators" often appear to overlook the power of such information. 32 So successful have the militants become at propaganda that many analysts doubt that the group achieved the transformation alone.
Joanna Nathan, an Afghan analyst who writes extensively on Taliban propaganda, blames "outside assistance from the media-savvy al-Qaeda". 33 "The Taliban blow stuff up to create an event that they can then market to the media and that will shape public perceptions," Rear Admiral Greg Smith, the foremost communications expert in the U.S. Navy, says. Petraeus said a host of essential "enablers" are still on the way to Afghanistan, a reference to either national level intelligence operators and special operations forces or more surveillance drones and aircraft, or both. General Petraeus dispels any notions that cyberspace operations might not be the threat some make it out to be. He identifies U.S. capabilities in cyberspace as one of the "big capabilities" that is lacking, and one he highlights to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) strategic review team.
"Cyberspace is a battleground, it cannot be uncontested, and the enemy cannot have free reign out in cyberspace anymore than they have free reign in a geographical location." 41 
Cyber Method to Counter Insurgent Propaganda and Cyber Tactics
Information operations are a critical aspect of warfare and will help determine the outcome in Afghanistan, focusing on the trust and confidence of the Afghan population. 42 There are effective applications available that aid in basic intelligence gathering.
Google Earth and similar programs are free and provide street-view photos of potential targets, as well as excellent route and obstacle information. The tendency of most Western countries to post nearly everything there is to know about critical infrastructures on unsecured Web sites is a great boon to the terrorists and requires no more expertise than an ability to use rudimentary search engines that small children master. All of this "research capability" assists the terrorists in making their standard operation procedures much easier and safer to polish to a high degree. Vigilance in protecting infiltration by cyber-insurgents must be on the front burner of all personnel to be successful.
Cyber Attack and Defense
There are millions of attempts on a daily basis to attack the cyber networks of the U.S. and Coalition systems supporting the ongoing counterinsurgency operation in Afghanistan. The attacks are attempts to gather intelligence, degrade, or destroy critical cyber systems to limit or disrupt the Commanders ability to command and control his forces. If the attacks are successful they may also limit the Commanders ability to communicate with the Afghan leaders and people.
Defending such attacks is extremely challenging not only for forces in Afghanistan but U.S. forces in the United States. The demand for protecting these critical systems is one that requires significant training, resources and support from agencies of all countries around the world. Cyber defense is a must if Coalition forces are to deny infiltration into military networks supporting the Afghan mission.
Computer Network Attack (CNA)
The Department of Defense (DoD) defines Computer Network Attack asoperations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. 57 Cyber Vulnerabilities
Like other Information
Operations, CNA has implications across the warfare spectrum, the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. In Afghanistan, Computer Network Attacks provide many benefits over the conventional physical reduction of an enemy capability, or by the use of CNA at the tactical level to achieve these goals. Defense officials did not describe the extent of damage on military networks but states the attack struck hard at networks within U.S. Central Command, the headquarters that oversees U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and affects computers in combat zones. 63 The attack also penetrated at least one highly protected classified network. Cyberspace is a critical enabler for the insurgents to achieve objectives. 70 Cyberspace is the new battlefield and unlike past battles where the war was lost with conventional weapons face-to-face, now the trust and confidence of the Afghan people is lost or won by radio broadcasts and news on the Internet. Without a doubt, cyberspace is lethal and extremely challenging to defeat in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. their credit, the J6X team reworked their approach, perhaps influenced by concepts presented by this author at that initial meeting, to the point where the final J6X effort was very similar to that presented during the meeting and to that suggested in this chapter. While this author had some very minor quibbles with the definition in the final product, it comes so close to many of the key points this author offered during the drafting process that we were clearly on the same sheet of music. The same is not true for the 2008 definition of cyberspace signed out by DepSecDef Gordon England.
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